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GOD TALK BY PROFESSORS WITHIN THE
CLASSROOMS OF PUBLIC INSTITUTIONS
OF HIGHER EDUCATION:
WHAT IS CONSTITUTIONALLY PERMISSIBLE?
by
SARAH HOWARD JENKINS, BYRON R. JOHNSON,

AND OTTO JENNINGS HELWEG*

A professor has a privileged position and influences students in ways many
professors are unaware. With this position comes an obligation not to abuse the
power to influence. Given this power to influence, there is an obligation to reveal
one's theological and philosophical view of life to students.

A professor who

*Sarah Howard Jenkins is an Assistant Professor of Law, Memphis State University School of Law; B.A.,
1969 Hanover College; M.A., 1970, J.D. 1982, University of Kentucky. Byron R. Johnson is an Associate
Professor in the Department of Sociology, Social Work and Corrections at Morehead State University;,
B.A., 1977 Minot State University; M.A., 1980 Middle Tennessee State University;, M.S., 1980 University
of Tennessee; Ph.D., 1984 Florida State University. Otto Jennings Helweg is Chair of the Civil
Engineering Department, Memphis State University; B.S., 1958 United States Naval Academy;, M. Div.,
1966 Fuller Theological Seminary;, M.S., 1967 UCLA; Ph.D., 1975 Colorado State University. The
authors wish to thank Thomas L. Shaffer, Professor of Law, Notre Dame Law School, John H. Garvey,
Professor of Law, University of Kentucky College of Law, and William Kratzke, Professor of Law, Memphis State University School of Law for their comments on a prior draft of this essay; and graduate
assistant, Michael S. Dlugach, Memphis State University School of Law, for his diligence.
In the Fall of 1989, the authors presented three independent oral presentations on the issue of
disclosing theological bias within the classrooms of public institutions of higher education to the Christian
Faculty Forum, a gathering of professors who teach graduate and undergraduate courses at Memphis State
University. The oral presentations addressed the ethical and biblical mandates for disclosing personal and
theological bias and the constitutional limitations on such disclosure as reflected in existing case authority.
These presentations were merged into one essay. The resulting essay was later modified to include a
discussion of Bishop v Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990). On June 29, 1992, approximately
thirty days prior to the scheduled publication of this essay, the United States Supreme Court, without an
opinion, denied certiorari in Bishop v. Delchamps, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. June 29, 1992) No. 91-286,
to the reversal by the Eleventh Circuit of the district court's holding that a professor's occasional remark
of his personal religious beliefs relevant to class discussion were protected speech and did not violate the
Establishment Clause. The authors believe that the Supree Court failed to address a critical issue - the
permissible scope of a public university professor's free speech right to engage in relevant religious
speech within the classroom of public institutions of higher education. The resulting silence by the Court
leaves unaddressed an opinion, albeit with limited precedential value, that permits a state university to
impose an absolute ban on religious speech by professors within classrooms of higher education.

mhe University seeks only to extricate itself from any religious influence or
instruction in its secular courses.
Heretofore, the University has apparently not found it necessary to remind its faculty
that the expression of a religious position in a secular subject, no matter how
carefully presented creates the appearance of endorsement of that position by the
University....
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does not consciously disclose his or her biases may, nonetheless, communicate
them to students less accurately than if discussed openly.!
Currently, our culture's privatization of religion inhibits the sharing of
theological views by professors. This posture reflects a radical change from the
historical development of education in general and modem higher education in
particular. On university and college campuses, campus administrators and even

campus attorneys are ignorant of the precise scope of legal constraints on disclosure of religious biases. Many assume the restrictions applicable to elementary
and secondary teachers apply as well in higher education. Only recently has the
issue been raised and addressed by the courts.2 This essay identifies the constitutional constraints that limit both the professor's disclosure of theological biases
and the state institution's effort to minimize disclosure of religious or theological
bias.

The State' as employer, may not impose by law or as a condition of
employment a duty on faculty to disclose their biases.4 Similarly, it is an established principle of law that teachers do not "shed" their First Amendment

Bishop v. Aronov, 926 F.2d 1066, 1077-78 (1 Ith Cir. 1991) (Gibson, J. writing for the court) (emphasis
added). To reach these astonishing conclusions, the court relied on Hazelwood School Dist. v. Kuhlmeier,
484 U.S. 260 (1988), which recognized the right of school officials to apply reasonable restrictions on
speech by high school students in a curriculum related student newspaper (a nonpublic forum) to
implement the school's basic educational mission. Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074. In holding that a total ban
on religious speech was "reasonably related to legitimate pedagogical concerns," the Eleventh Circuit
failed to distinguish the basic educational mission of public high schools and that of public universities.
First Amendment rights must be applied in light of the special characteristics of the school environment.
Kuhlmeier, 484 U.S. at 564. (See text, infra, at notes 121-135). These special characteristics include the
age and maturity of the students, the nature and relevancy of the speech, and the educational mission of
the institution. The Eleventh Circuit failed to focus on these factors. See Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1074. See
also note 140, infra.
' In Crampton, The Ordinary Religion of the Law School Classroom, 29 J.LEGAL EDUC. 247 (1978),
Dean Cramton identifies and criticizes what he perceives as unarticulated values in modem law school
classes - a skeptical attitude toward generalizations, an instrumental approach to law and lawyering, a
tough minded and analytical attitude towards legal tasks and professional roles, and a faith in man to
make the world better through the use of reason and the democratic process. These values, he suggests,
are taught implicitly. Later, in Beyond The Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987), Dean
Cramton argues that rather than being implicitly taught values should be "openly and forthrightly" taught
Professors, he continues, should have something to profess on ultimate questions that students address
such as "Who am I?".
2 Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd., 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, Bishop v. Delchamps, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. June 29, 1992) No. 91-286. See note 140, infra,
for a discussion of this case.
3The legal rules discussed and applied in this section are limited in application to professors in public
institutions of higher education. The rights and limitations on professors employed by private institutions
are governed by the contractual agreement between the parties.
4See, e.g., Torcaso v. Watkins, 367 U.S. 488 (1961) (state may not require declaration of belief in God
as a condition of state employment); Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183 (1952) (state may not require
its employees to establish their loyalty by extracting an oath denying past affiliation with communists);
West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943) (compulsory flag salute and pledge
invades First Amendment rights).
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freedoms at the schoolhouse gate or classroom door.5 First Amendment freedoms are not forgone with the acceptance of public employment.6 The State's
need and interest as employer "in promoting the efficiency of the public services
it performs through its employee" must, however, be balanced with the interests
of the teacher in exercising his or her First Amendment right of expression which
includes the right to express political and religious opinion on matters of public
interest. 7 Juxtaposed to this interest is the State's Constitutional duty to avoid
the establishment of religion by professors - state actors - when they engaged in
disclosure of a religious nature.
This essay establishes, first, the professional aspects of disclosure. Second,
it defines the equipoise between the State's interest in efficiency and the teacher's
interest in exercising his or her First Amendment right of expression of religious
opinion on matters of public interest. Third, the essay identifies expressive
activities of the teacher within the classroom that should be accorded First
Amendment protection pursuant to James v. Board of Education.8 Fourth, the
essay examines whether the professor's disclosure of personal and theological

biases in a classroom constitutes state action and concludes that a professor
fulfilling his or her assigned tasks within the classroom is a state actor. The essay
then examines whether the classes of disclosure of personal and theological biases
consistent with standards enunciated in James v. Board of Education violate the
Establishment Clause.9 This essay concludes that such disclosure does not run
afoul of the Lemon v. Kurtzman' ° test and does not result in the Establishment
of religion.11
PROFESSIONAL ASPECTS OF LIMITS
12

Religious Heritage of the Modern University

When the invention of letters precipitated formal education, the priesthood
and free citizens encouraged only limited formal education. The Greeks were the
first to transfer education to secular control. Even then, the pantheon, the center
of Greek worship, was an integral part of the curriculum. Christianity introduced
education to the underprivileged. During the "age of faith" or the Middle Ages,

'Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 506 (1969).
6 Pied v. Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 855 (5th Cir. 1969).
7

Id. at 857; Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968).

8 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972).

9Id.
'0 403 U.S. 602 (1971).

" See infra text accompanying notes 82-99.
12 See

generally, E.P. Cubberly, A BRIEF HISTORY OF EDUCATION (1922).
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the primary emphasis was on moral training. Later, the renaissance reintroduced
an interest in the classics such as Aristotelian ethics and logic.
After the collapse of the Roman Empire in the 5th and 6th centuries, the
monastic and cathedral schools developed from educationally weak pockets of
education to intellectual leadership in the 11th and 12th centuries. The first
universities were organizations of students, the studium in Bologna around 1158
being the first. The Paris studum became famous for arts and theology. Oxford
and Cambridge also came into being at this time. The 16th Century Reformation
signaled another impetus to spread education to the masses. Christianity
but it was much later that
introduced the moral equality of men and women,
3
women found acceptance into higher education.1
Public education in the United States was an outgrowth of the Reformation.
"The Puritans . . . were determined that children should receive sufficient
education to insure their ability to read the Bible and participate in religious
services.' 14 This religious heritage of public education was reflected in one
Massachusetts law adopted in 1642 that imposed a fine if children were not taught
"to read and understand the principle of religion and the capital laws of this
country."' 5 This was the first time that a legislative body in the Englishspeaking world ordered that all children be taught to read.
The first college in the United States was authorized by the General Court
of Massachusetts in 1636 to "advance learning and perpetuate it to posterity;
dreading to leave an illiterate ministry to the churches, when our present ministers
shall lie in the dust."1 6 Later this college was named "Harvard" in memory of
the young clergyman, John Harvard, who died leaving his books and a sum of
money to the school.
In 1701 Yale was established for the purpose of fitting the youth of the
colony, "for Public employment both in Church & Civil State."' 7 In almost all

" See generally, T. Woody, A HISTORY OF WOMEN'S EDUCATION IN THE UNITED STATES (1966).
14C.F. Thwing, A HISTORY OF HIGHER EDUCATION IN AMERICA (1906)[hereinafterTiWNG, A HISTORY].
See also D. Boles, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC SCHOOLS (1965); L Crernin, THE AMERICAN
COMMON SCHOOL AN HISTORICAL CONCEPTION (1951).
" 10 Alvey, Elementary Education, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 209 (1989); see also, N. Schachner,

CHURCH, STATE, AND EDUCATION 11, reprinted from 49 THE AMERICAN JEWISH YEAR BOOK 1947-48,
American Jewish Committee (1947) (quoted in D. Boles, THE BIBLE, RELIGION, AND THE PUBLIC
SCHOOLS (1965).
16 9 Kneller, Post-SecondaryEducation, in ENCYCLOPEDIA AMERICANA 689 (1989); see generally Lieder,
Religious Pluralism and Education in Historical Perspective: A Critique of the Supreme Court's
Establishment Clause Jurisprudence,22 WAKE FOREST L REV. 813 (1987).
1 D.G. Tewksbury, THE FOUNDING OF AMERICAN COLLEGES AND UNIVERSTmES BEFORE THE CIVIL WAR
82 (1932 & reprint 1972).
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of the early institutions of higher education in the United States, "[rieligion was
the strongest determinant of purpose and content."' 8
The cleavage between public and private education began with the Dartmouth
College case in 1819.'9 This decision guaranteed private ownership of institutions of learning and guarded such institutions from encroachment by the state.
Since that time, there has been a gradual secularization of higher education to the
extent that the present professorate and student body are generally unaware of the
religious heritage and foundation of colleges and universities. Though some may
applaud this trend, its cost has been significant - the cost of failing to speak to the
whole person - as noted in the Carnegie Foundation report.20
The University Must Speak to the Whole Person
The Carnegie Foundation launched a major effort to investigate the malaise
of the present system of higher education.2' The authors of the final report
repeated, time and again, that the university evolved from an institution that spoke
to the whole man, to an impersonal environment with students crying for
existential answers.2 Boyer felt that the colleges "lost their sense of purpose"
and quoted Archibald MacLeish as saying, "There can be no educational
postulates so long as there are no generally accepted postulates of life itself. 2 3
The researchers found "a great separation, sometimes to the point of
isolation, between academic and social life on campus."'
Faculty and
administrators were viewed as confused about their obligations in nonacademic
matters. This led Boyer to ask, "How can the undergraduate college help students
gain perspective and prepare them to meet 2their
civic and social obligations in the
5
neighborhood, the nation, and the world?
While there are other concerns confronting the academic such as the tension
between teaching and research, the question this essay addresses is whether the
university is more than a place where information is imparted. Is the university
not also a place where young people are challenged to ask, "How ought I to
live?" "Who am I?" "What meaning, if any, does life have?"

" 9 Kneller, Post-Secondary Education, in

ENCYCLoPEDIA AMERICANA 689 (1989).
9Id., see Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 WheaL) 518 (1819).
20E. L.Boyer, Coy.'EGE: TIE UNDERGRADUATE EXPERIENCE iN AMEwCA (1987).
21 Id. at vii.

Id. at 178, 204.
2 Boyer, supra note 20 at 3.
24Id. at 5.
2

23Jd.

at 6.
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Increasing family instability has amplified the stress caused by universities
in abandoning their role as integrators of knowledge. As a result of the
fragmentation of the family unit, the entire educational system is being asked to
take over functions that have traditionally been assumed by parents. Many single
parent families, families where both parents work outside the home, blended
families resulting from divorce and remarriage, and even traditional two-parent
families fail to train their children in areas such as theology, sex education,
alternative world views, and fundamental value systems essential for living in an
open society. More and more, parents individually and society as a whole expect
schools, especially elementary and secondary schools to be in loco parentis, "to
tend to their [the students'] moral development. '26 This need arises at a time
when universities have moved in the opposite direction.
In the early 1900's, college authorities -- the administration and faculty -stood in loco parentis to their students in regulating the students' social and moral
welfare27 both on and off campus. As "parent," the university or college
formulated regulations for the student's well-being. 28 However, this parent/child
relationship was altered in 1971 with the passage of the Twenty-Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution which guaranteed 18 year olds the right to
vote. College and university students were no longer viewed as children
submitted to the authority of the university but rather as "semi-autonomous
citizen[s]"29 often with values, views, and ideologies at war with those of the
institution and its authorities. 30 No longer viewed as "parent", the university
became a sanctuary for presenting, exchanging, and debating ideas; the
"spawning ground for novel theorems and intellectual ferment;' 1 a haven for the
heretical as well as the orthodox. Even so, educators believed that learning was
more "than simply sitting in a classroom. 3 2 Personal communication among
students fostered value development as an essential part of the educational
process.3 3
While the university cannot and should not function as a parent, Boyer and
26

Doe v. Human, 725 F. Supp. 1503, 1507 (W.D. Ark. 1989), cert. denied, 111 St Ct. 1315 (1991).

27 See,

e.g., Gott v. Berea College, 156 Ky. 376, 161 S.W. 204 (1913); State ex rel. Ingersoll v. Clapp,

81 Mont. 200, 263 P. 433 (1928), cert. denied, 277 U.S. 591 (1928).
See generallyJones, In Loco ParentisReborn: Whitlock v. University of Denver, 34 W. EDuC. L. REP.
995 (1986).
29 Doe v. Human, 725 F. Supp. 1503, 1507 (W.D. Ark. 1989), cert. denied, 111 S. CL 1315 (1991).
23

30 Healy v. James, 408 U.S.

169, 197 (1972).

3' Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 547 (3rd Cir. 1984), vacated on other

grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
32 Pratz v. Louisiana Polytechnic Institute, 316 F. Supp. 872, 880 (1970), affd, 401 U.S. 1004 (1971)
(students brought class action seeking to have college regulations requiring students to reside in oncampus facilities declared unconstitutional).
31 Id. at 880, 883.
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others argue that universities should at least reverse the existing trend toward
faculty-student isolation and revive the practice of mentoring. Personal
communication of values between the faculty and students is as essential to the
educational process as communication among students.
The Professor as Mentor
Mentor was the wise advisor to Odysseus and teacher of his son, Telemachus. Mentor accompanied Telemachus on long journeys, teaching him more than
formal subjects and endeavoring to make him a complete adult by teaching him
how to live. If present-day mentors followed the example of their namesake, they
too would be involved in every aspect of the student's life. Boyer writes,
"[T]here remains a vision of the undergraduate college as a place where teachers
care about their students.. . ."34 He continues
[t]he American college is, we believe, ready for renewal, and there is an
urgency to the task. The nation's colleges have been successful in responding
to diversity and in meeting the needs of individual students. They have been
much less attentive to the larger, more transcendent issues that give meaning
to existence and help students put their own lives in perspective.3 5
Typical of the extreme criticism that professors have received from those
decrying the present state of higher education is that of C. J. Sykes in his book,
ProfScam: Professor and the Demise of Higher Education.'
In the midst of this wasteland [university] stands the professor. Almost
single-handedly, the professors - working steadily and systematically - have
destroyed the university as a center of learning and have desolated higher
education, which no longer is higher or much of an education. 7
On the positive side, yet illustrating the paucity of professors who care, is the
following statement of a Memphis State University student on his course
evaluation:
I felt that he [the professor] was a breath of fresh air. He cares about his
students and whether or not they learn the material. He is a very effective
teacher - an exception these days! [emphasis added]

Boyer, supra note 20 at 7.
3

id.

36

C. . Sykes, PROFsCAM: PROFESSOR AND THE DEMISE OF HIGHER EDUCATION (1988).

37Id.

at 4.
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As a department chairman, one of us [Helweg] has noticed that students quickly
identify and appreciate professors who are concerned about them as individuals,
especially when this concern is expressed outside of class and beyond the subject
area.
The professor's historical role has been that of imparting values for the
development of the whole person, not just the intellect. Thus, the heritage of
higher education, the student's need for wholistic development along with the
professor's role as mentor, strongly suggest that a professor has an obligation to
disclose personal and religious biases.
Complicating the obligation of professors to be more than mere purveyors
of knowledge is the position of many Christian professors that they should avoid
including any religious content in their courses, even courses linked to religious
themes. This position often results from the lack of knowledge of biblical
imperatives mandating disclosure, and the misapplication of legal limitations on
indoctrinating religious views in elementary and secondary schools to professors
at state institutions of higher education.
CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS ON DIscLOsURE BY PROFESSORS

Free Speech Activity Within the Classroom
The heritage of the teaching profession in higher education and the needs of
today's students establish a mandate for disclosure of philosophical and
theological bias by professors. However, the professor's interest in exercising the
First Amendment right of expression in disclosing biases must be balanced with
the State's need and interest in efficiency and its obligation to adhere to Constitutional constraints on religious activity. Establishing a balance between these
interests requires an assessment of the facts and circumstances surrounding the
teacher's conduct, such as the wearing of religious or political symbols, the
making of religious or political statements, or the assigning or teaching of certain
ideas, materials, or books. This essay establishes that conduct by teachers should
first satisfy the rationale enunciated in James v. Board of Education.38 If the
teacher's conduct does not result in a material interference with the operation of
the class, it must then be tested under the Establishment Clause.
Factors such as the age and educational level of the students, 39 the nature
and purpose of the class,4° the content of the statement, expression, or materi-

3 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
39
Id. at 573.
o Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970) (civilian
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al,' and the manner of expression - whether to indoctrinate or objectively
communicate 42 - must be considered to determine whether the teacher's conduct
or expression resulted in a material or substantial interference with the requirements of appropriate discipline in the operation of the school. These factors must
be considered by teachers when they consider wearing religious symbols or
including religious reading material in course curricula. The central question is
whether the intended expression will materially disrupt class work, invade the
rights of others, or cause substantial disorder given the students' age, educational
level, and nature of the course.
Several general guidelines have been developed by courts to assess the
equipose between the interests of the State and the teacher. For elementary and
secondary school children, the First Amendment does not protect expressions by
the teacher that indoctrinate the teacher's personal religious ideas or opinion.43
Indoctrination is the attempt to persuade others that the espoused values and only
the espoused values should be adopted."M "When a teacher is only content if he
persuades his students that his values and only his values ought to be their values
then it is not unreasonable to expect the state to protect impressionable children
from such dogmatism."' 5 Thus, the First Amendment rights of a teacher who
is discharged for indoctrinating her religious beliefs in an elementary or secondary
class are not abridged or violated by the discharge. The First Amendment does
not protect the teacher's expression in such a case. The indoctrination of
religious ideas or values by teachers in elementary and secondary schools is
unprotected.'
However, the First Amendment is interpreted with greater flexibility in the
context of higher education.47 College students are deemed less impressionable
and less susceptible to religious or political indoctrination than younger

employed by the Air Force to teach a "quick training in basic English" to foreign military officers from
diverse cultures in the United States at the invitation of the government).
4'

Parducci v. Rutland, 316 F.Supp. 352 (M.D. Ala. 1970) (teacher assigns short story containing several

vulgar terms and a reference to an involuntary sexual act to high school juniors).
42
J Whitehead, THE FREEDOM OF RELIGIOUS EXPRESSION IN PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES

AND HIGH SCHOOLS

22 (2d ed. 1985) (discussing School District of Abington Township v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225
(1963)).
"' James, 461 F.2d at 573 (eleventh grade teacher wore black armband as religious and political
expression of his antiwar beliefs).
44lit See also I. Whitehead, THE FREEDOM OF REuGious EXPRESsIoN IN PUBLIC UNIvERsrnEs AND
HIGH SCHOOLS 46 (2d ed. 1985).
4 James, 461 F.2d at 573 (emphasis added).

46id.
4

" Kritchevsky, Graduation and the Establishment Clause, Fall 1988 Memphis State Lawyer (Alumni
Magazine) at 6; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981).
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students.4 Undergraduates and professional students are presumed to possess
the intellectual, rational, and experimental maturity to choose between competing
value systems. Furthermore, exposure to competing value systems is deemed
essential for continued self-government, self-fulfillment, and the acquisition of

truth

9

Although indoctrination is not as great a concern for teachers in higher
50
education, material presented and statements made in class should be relevant
Thus, the Air Force did not violate First Amendment rights when it discharged
a civilian employed to teach a class in basic English to foreign military
officers.5 The civilian teacher made statements of personal opinion on the
Vietnam war protests and the prevalence of discrimination against Jews in the
United States, including discrimination by his employer. 52 The District of
Columbia Court of Appeals found little relevancy between the statements and the
class objectives of teaching conversational English and upheld the discharge. 3
The Fifth Circuit's opinion in Pred v. Board of Public Instruction of Dade
County, Fla." provides some insight on the degree of correlation needed
between the expression or material and class objectives. In Pred, a Junior
College teacher encouraged student participation in the local teachers association's
demand for greater campus freedoms during a literature class.5 5 The court
rejected the Junior College's argument that statements by the teacher were not
relevant to the course and therefore should not be accorded First Amendment
protection." Relevancy, the court stated, was not necessarily limited to the
57
confines of "the technicalities of a particular subject or academic discipline.
The court viewed a discussion of freedom an appropriate one for a literature
class.58 Furthermore, the court perceived that restricting teachers to the
technicalities of the subject matter would adversely affect the teacher-student
Tilton v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 672, 685-86 (1971). reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 874 (1971) (plurality
opinion); Widmar, 454 U.S. at 274 n. 14; Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens,
110 S.Ct. 2356, 2363-64 (1990).
49Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969); Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616,
630 (1919) (Holmes, J. dissenting); see generally, Ingber, Socialization, Indoctrination,or the "Pallof
Orthodoxy." Value Training in the Public Schools, 1987 U. OF ILL. L. REv. 15, 20-25.
s0Goldwasser v. Brown, 417 F.2d 1169 (D.C. Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 922 (1970); Pred v.
Board of Public Instruction, 415 F.2d 851, 857 n.17 (5th Cir. 1969).
" Goldwasser, 417 F.2d at 1177.
52 Id. at 1171.
-3 Id. at 1177.
48

415 F.2d 851 (5th Cir. 1969).
I at 853.
Id.
"Id. at 857 n.17.
37 id.
38 Id.
54
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relationship and the "teacher's role in character building." 59 If the goal of higher
education is to expose the individual to a "market basket of ideas" in order to
guarantee a form of self-government responsive to the autonomous individual,
relevancy must not be limited to the technicalities of the subject matter, but
should be broadly interpreted to implement the goal of educating the whole person. Again, the test applied is whether the conduct by the teacher will materially
disrupt class work, or invade the rights of others, or create substantial disorder.
Finally, the content of the expression is a factor to be considered. 60
Appellate courts addressing the issue of whether statements made within the
classroom should be accorded First Amendment protection rely on case authority
addressing the content of statements made outside of the classroom.61 Statements
that are (1) false and knowingly or recklessly made or false although carelessly
made on confidential subjects that relate to the day to day operation of the school;
or (2) directed towards those with whom the teacher has daily contact in
performing his or her professional duties and that adversely affect the harmony,
personal loyalty, or confidence needed in a working relationship are not
protected.6 Speech that is disruptive, aimed at disrupting or likely to disrupt
"the proper working relationship" between students and the administrator,63 or
the teacher and the administration or the teacher and the students 65 is not
within the scope of protected expression. Hence, a biology professor's statement
criticizing the administration and other teachers was held unprotected.6
Specific Forms of Expressions
The foregoing general principles were applied by courts seeking to determine
whether the discharge of a teacher or a failure to renew a teacher's contract,
motivated by some expression by the teacher, constituted a violation of the
teacher's First Amendment rights. From these cases, certain conclusions may be
reached as to the kind of conduct that is entitled to First Amendment protection

'9"With its inexorable logic and predictability them may even be a great moral lesson in 2 x 2 equal 4."

Id. See text supra. at note 21.
"See Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568-574 (1968).
6" Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973); Pred, 415 F.2d at
858; Katz, The First Amendment's Protection of Expressive Activity in the University Class: A
Constitutional Myth, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 857, 909-912 (1983).
62Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568-574.

v. Hazelwood School Dist., 352 F. Supp. 613, 621 (E.D. Mo. 1972), affid, 491 F.2d 490 (8th
Cir. 1974) (teacher in algebra class stated that high school of 4000 should rid the campus of military
personnel).
64 Birdwell, 352 F. Supp. at 621 (algebra teacher confronts military visitor).
6Birdwell

"See, e.g., Resetar v. State Bd. of Educ., 284 Md. 537, 545, 399 A.2d 225, 232 (1979), cert. denied, 444
U.S. 838 (1979)(teacher calls students "jungle bunnies").
66Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 931 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 972 (1973).
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and should not be the basis for denying promotion or tenure, or justifying
discharge of a university or college professor at a State or public institution.
1. Symbolic Expression
Teachers at the university level may wear religious insignia such as pins,
crosses, or doves. 67 However, buttons stating Christian slogans or ideas
including "Jesus is Lord" pins are no longer pure symbolic expressions. These
must be treated as statements within the classroom.6
2. Teaching Material With Religious Content
Within departmental guidelines and course descriptions,6 teachers in higher
education are free to include any relevant material in the presentation of the
subject matter. Thus, a biologist or geologist is free to include a biblical
perspective on the earth's formation or the beginning of life; a philosophy teacher
may distinguish Aristotle's view and Paul's view on free will or predestination.
A literature class discussion on similes and metaphors might include parables
from the gospel of Matthew as well as excerpts from Shakespeare's Hamlet. A
course in history or literature may include the Bible as a required text. The religious material must be covered objectively "as part of a secular program""° with
the goal of communicating information and not indoctrinating beliefs. However,
given the age and educational level of the students, a presentation of the relevant
biblical material coupled with the teacher's espousal or identification with the
view and the acknowledgment of contrary views should be accorded First Amendment protection.
Additionally, a state statute, departmental guideline, or course description that
directs a professor at a public institution of higher education7' to omit references
to relevant biblical views in course materials may abridge First Amendment

' James v. Board of Educ., 461 F.2d 566, 569 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), reh'g
denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
"sSee infra text accompanying notes 108-121.

6 The state or its designee may establish school curriculum Epperson v. Arkansas, 393 U.S. 97, 104
(1968)(state has the right to establish curriculum but such authority may not be used to reflect the
religious beliefs of the majority); Clark v. Holmes, 474 F.2d 928, 930 (7th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411
U.S. 972 (1973) (teacher failed to establish constitutional right to override judgment of superiors as to
proper content of health course); Mercer v. Michigan State Board of Education, 379 F. Supp. 580, 585
(E.D. Mich.), affd, 419 U.S. 1081 (1974)(teacher brought a declaratory judgment action against state
board of education asserting that his First Amendment rights were violated by state statute that prohibited
the teaching of birth control in a sex and health education course in the Michigan public schools;
held: the state or its designee, local school boards and communities. may establish school curriculum).
" Abington School District v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 225 (1963); M. Yudof, WHEN GOVERNMENT
SPEAKS, 214 n.5 (1983).
"' Subject to contractual limitations, professors at private institutions may say whatever they please.
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rights.7 The State may neither establish a religion including a humanistic
perspective nor may it provide a persuasive advantage to one particular
doctrine." Just as the State may not require the teaching of creationism or
creation science in elementary and secondary school because of the involuntary
attendance of impressionable children,74 the State may not require teachers to
omit relevant religious material deemed appropriate by the teacher in the exercise
Older
of his or her professional judgment in classes of higher education.
are
less
likely
voluntarily
enroll
in
university
and
college
courses
students who
to be subject to the kind of undue influence that results when role modelling
authority figures engage in such conduct in elementary and secondary classes. 6
Therefore, other constitutional concerns such as the free exchange of ideas, the
professor's right to speak on topics of religious significance and the right to teach,
and the students right to learn must be given greater consideration.
3. Statements in Class
Between symbolic expression and teaching materials with religious content
is the middle ground of making statements in class that either identify the teacher
with a particular religious conviction or reflect a value judgment based on
personal theological briefs.
a.

Statements Identifying the Professor With a Particular
Religious Conviction.

Are the statements: "I am a born-again Christian and my commitment to
Jesus Christ, whom I believe is the promised Messiah, colors and conditions my
perception of material issues", or the exclamation, "Praise the Lord!", protected
speech?
First, both of these expressions contain protected subject matter, religious
beliefs or religious terms." Unlike profane language, 78 these expressions relate
to the constitutionally protected right to hold and express religious beliefs, a

n Cf. Epperson v. Arkansas. 393 U.S. 97, 105-106 (1968) (state statute prohibiting the teaching of any
theory of man's creation contrary to Genesis in public elementary and secondary schools was the
establishment of religion).
'
Given the secular trend of modem society and its growing hostility toward religion, care must be taken
to avoid the establishment of a "religion of secularism". See Abington, 374 U.S. at 225.
' Edwards v. Aquillard, 482 U.S. 578, 584 (1987).
7 Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263, 267 n.5 (1981).
6
7 1d. at 267 n.5.
Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 147-148 (1983) (the content, form, and context of a statement must
be considered).
'
See, e.g., Martin v. Parrish, 805 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1986) (professor's use of profanity constitutionally
unprotected).
7
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matter of public and social concern and often a subject of public debate. Second,
the first statement carries educational significance in that it is relevant to the
teacher-student relationship. This statement honestly communicates the teacher's
frame of reference when judging performance and critiquing course material. The
second expression is an exclamation to reward student performance. As any
exclamation of praise, such as "Wow!" or "Right on," the statement "Praise the
Lord" encourages student performance and reflects the teacher's personal values
on the source of knowledge and wisdom without indoctrination. Third, neither
statement is an invasion of the student's right to hold beliefs contrary to the
speaker's view. Finally, these statements are not critical of administrative or
faculty personnel or policy; they are not prejudicial statements directed toward
persons with whom the teacher has daily contact in performing his or her duties.
Therefore, such statements are protected speech. 79 This conduct, when exercised, cannot serve as the basis for denial of tenure or promotion, or as a basis
for discharge. Additionally, this same conduct may not be the sole basis for
denying employment to a prospective professor with a reputation of engaging in
conduct that results in disclosure of personal or theological biases. s°
b.

Statements Reflecting Values based on Personal or
Theological Convictions.

Beyond statements such as "Praise the Lord," which identify the professor
with a particular value orientation are statements of personal views and
perspectives that are a byproduct of the professor's theological bias. In courses
on constitutional law, criminal law, or family law, issues such as abortion,
sodomy, obscenity, artificial insemination, and the death penalty necessitate a
discussion of public policy and implicate personal and theological views. Is a
Catholic professor's espousal of his pro-life view on abortion based on a theological bias protected? Yes!'
The First Amendment protects and safeguards academic freedom on
campuses of public colleges and universities.' The teachers' freedom to teach to select methods, materials, and share ideas - is essential for the continuation of

" Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 810 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (instructor's announcement that he was a
communist is protected speech).
so See Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 383 U.S. 589, 608-09 (1967).
8' See, e.g., Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (professor stated his personal and
philosophical views based on Marxism). But see, Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990)
(christian professor referred to his religious belief on the creative force behind the human physiology),
rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066, 1076 (11th Cit. 1991), cert denied, Bishop v. Delchamps, 60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S.
June 29, 1992) No. 91-286 (professor may only make relevant disclosure of religious views if asked by

a student).
82

Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 249-250 (1957).
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an environment that produces interactive discussion. 83 The professor is the
catalyst. He or she must have the freedom to disclose relevant philosophical and
personal perspectives, even those based on theological biases, if he or she so
desires. The mission of the university is to be a marketplace of ideas, the
breeding ground for novel approaches to age-old conditions." To censure those
professors whose views are based on a theological bias, especially given the
prevailing social disapproval of religion, not only has the effect of communicating
a disapproval of religious values or thought, but also results in a pall of orthodoxy
on the university classroom. 85 Here, however, the orthodox is the irreligious.
As previously demonstrated, there are limitations on disclosure of personal
views. First, the disclosure must be relevant. The disclosure must relate to the
course content. In the context of legal education this includes relevance to
professional ethics as well as establishing and maintaining the teacher/student
relationship. Discussion of personal views by faculty are "the norm used to
establish rapport between faculty and students."16 Second, the class must not
be materially disrupted. Disruption includes devoting such time to informing
students of personal or theological views that instruction of the subject matter is
impaired or proselytizing of students results. $7 Within these limitations,
disclosure of personal views or values based on theological bias is protected
speech. These limitations must also be applied to the wearing of buttons with
religious slogans within the classroom. Unless relevancy can be established
between the words or phrases on the buttons and either the course content,
professional ethics, or the teacher/student relationship, buttons with slogans should
not be worn.88
c.

Free Speech Activities Within the Classroom and the
Establishment Clause. 9

In the public educational system, the exercise of free speech by a professor

83

See generally Developments in the Law -- Academic Freedom, 81 HARV. L. REv. 1045 (1968).

" Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist, 741 F.2d 538, 547 (3rd Cir. 1984), vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986).
85
If they [teachers] are free to interpose their own judgments, values, and comments that are
not, cannot, or should not be closely monitored, we have introduced a sort of pluralism into
the school environment
M. Yudof, WHEN GOVERNm"NT SPEAxs, at 216 (1983).
8
6 Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1564.
87

See, e.g., Id. at 1566; Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802, 811 n.5 (E.D. Ark. 1979).

8 Monitoring and controlling this aspect of a professor's speech may result in excessive entanglement
with religion. See infra text accompanying notes 136-140.
U.S. CONST. amend I.

89
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may be subject to the limitations of the Establishment Clause. 90 The public
university or college may seek to justify restrictions on free speech activity based
on its constitutional responsibility to avoid the establishment of religion. Because
the professor is the university's employee, the university may assert that the
professor's free speech will be deemed state action, or action by the university in
the eyes of its students or the public. Additionally, a student might initiate an
action to enjoin a professor's free speech activity on the basis of the Establishment Clause.
To determine whether certain speech violates the Establishment Clause, a
factual analysis must be made with emphasis on the circumstances of the
individual case. In the absence of proof of a violation of the Establishment
Clause, the university lacks the requisite compelling state interest to justify
abridging the professor's free speech interest. 91
State Action
The First Amendment prohibition against the establishment of religion is
extended to the states through the Fourteenth Amendment.9 2 However, neither
the First Amendment nor the Fourteenth Amendment is a limitation on private
action. Some nexus 93must exist between the state and the challenged action by the
individual or entity.
This essay identifies three classes of expression: (1) the individual
professor's wearing of religious insignia - symbolic expression; (2) the professor's
selecting of relevant course material from religious books or writings; and (3) the
professor's disclosing of relevant personal or theological views to provide an
alternative view on course material or issues, to reveal fundamental value
orientation essential for an honest and forthright interpersonal relationship, and
to encourage the development of student character. None of these activities entail
officially organized or mandated conduct. Neither a statute nor university
regulation dictates the activity. Unlike the officially organized prayer or bible

9 See Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263,270-275 (1981); Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741
F.2d 538, 558 (1984). See generally Mincberg, The Supreme Court and the FirstAmendment: the 198990 Term. 8 N.Y.L SCH. 3. HUM. RTs. 1, 10 (1990).
" See Bender, 741 F.2d at 550, Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562, 1566-68 (N.D. Ala. 1990), rev'd,
926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Bishop v. Delchamps, 60 U.S.LW. 3154 (U.S. June 29,
1992) No. 91-286.
92See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303-04 (1940).
93 See,

e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 349-351 (1974) (action by regulated utility
challenged as "state action").
94Cf. Treen v. Karen B., 653 F.2d 897 (1981), aff'd, 455 U.S. 913 (1982); May v. Cooperman, 572 F.
Supp. 1561 (D.N.J. 1983), affid in part and dismissed in part, 780 F.2d 240 (3rd Cir. 1985).
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reading disapproved in Engel v. Vitale95 and Abington School District v.
Schempp, the professor's disclosure of personal commitment or values relevant
to course content or the student/professor relationship is not mandated by statute
or university regulation. No nexus exists between the professor's expression and
activity of the university or state. Of concern, however, is the establishment of
religion by a "state actor" - a state employee engaging in purely personal conduct
while fulfilling assigned tasks and duties.
The Federal District Court of Michigan confronted this issue in Breen v.
Runker and held that the unauthorized personal activities of an elementary
school teacher in praying and reading the Bible within an elementary school
classroom involved state action and violated the Establishment Clause.9 s
Because teachers were selected, suspended, and removed by the school board creature of and controlled by state law - actions by teachers, in their capacity as
classroom teachers, were those of "state actors." 99 The Breen court resolved the
conflict between the assert free speech right of the teacher to pray and read the
bible in the elementary classroom and the prohibitions of the Establishment
Clause by relying on the Supreme Court precedent of Abington Township School
District v. Schempp.1°° Any activity deemed impermissible for the state as an
entity, such as statutorily imposed prayer and bible reading, was, the court held,
likewise impermissible when engaged in by a state actor. 0 1 Unfortunately, in
reaching its conclusion, the Breen court failed to determine whether the teachers'
conduct -- the purported exercise of free speech -- satisfied a balancing test
similar to that employed by the Second Circuit in James v. Board of Education.1°2 This is the first hurdle that free speech activity within the public
education system should be required to clear before being accorded First
Amendment protection. The Bible readings addressed by the court in Breen were
neither relevant to the subjects taught nor objectively presented3 °3 Rather, the
hypothetical facts considered by the court indicated an intent to indoctrinate
young impressionable school age children.'0 4 Consequently, the teachers'
370 U.S. 421 (1962).

374 U.S. 203 (1963).
97 614 F. Supp. 355, 358

(W.D. Mich 1985).

" Id. at 359-60.
l1d. at 358.
347 U.S. 203. 233 (1963).
'0' Breen, 614 F. Supp., at 360.
1W

'' 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972). cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), reh'g denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
1m As a religious activity, prayer within the public classroom authorized by the state or engaged in by a
state actor has been uniformly held to be unconstitutional. See Wallace v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. 38, 41
(1985); Abington School Dist. v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203, 223 (1963); Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421,436

(1962).
10"

See generally Engle, 370 U.S. 421.
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activities were unprotected speech.'05 The Establishment Clause analysis and
the attempt to harmonize the tension between the Free Speech Clause and Establishment clause were, thus, premature.
Of concern here is the court's determination that the personal activities of the
teachers were, effectively, state action - action by a "state actor". Three
considerations underlie the court's assessment of personal disclosure in the public
educational system and the application of the "state actor" doctrine. First, there
is the potential for preferential selection - school boards or other governmental
authorities may only select those individuals who will represent or espouse a
specific value or religious orientation. Second, with notice of the teacher's
activity, the failure of governmental authority to restrict expressive activities that
establish religion might result in a ratification of the conduct, constituting state
action. 1°0 Finally, when functioning in their capacity as classroom teachers,
teachers fulfill a "public function."" °
The first concern, preferential selection, has less validity and is a more
tenuous justification for finding a "state actor" in the university and college
setting than in primary and secondary schools. The prevailing milieu on
American university and college campuses is a diverse intellectual and ethnic
culture. Selection of college and university professors is made with the intent to
create and maintain this diverse intellectual, cultural, and ethnic environment. A
university's goal in both its academic and athletic programs is to prepare its
constituents to compete effectively with students from other respected institutions
in the nation. The institution is motivated by these goals to adopt hiring policies
that promote breadth in its faculty rather than duplication of specific views.
The second concern, ratification, also lacks validity as a basis for subjecting
individual disclosure to scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. The principle
of ratification was applied by the Eleventh Circuit in Jaffree v. Wallace08 when
it addressed unauthorized prayer and Bible reading by individual teachers in
public school classrooms. The record before the court established that school
board members were informed of the prayer activities occurring within the
classroom and failed to take steps to discourage activities which, if authorized by

106See supra text accompanying

notes 75-128.

'06See, e.g., Jaffree v. Wallace, 705 F.2d 1526, 1533-34 (1lth Cir. 1983). aff'dmem., (state action issue),
466 U.S. 924 (1984), aff'd 472 U.S. 38 (1985).
107 See, e.g., Flagg Brothers, Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149 (1978); Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison

Company, 419 U.S. 345 (1974); Janusaitis v. Middlebury Volunteer Fire Department, 607 F.2d 17 (2d
Cir. 1979); Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 396 (D. Conn. 1985) (volunteer fire
department a state actor because of its interrelation with municipal government).
'06 705 F.2d 1526, 1533-34 (1983).

Fall, 199 1]

GOD TALK WrHIN THE CLASSROOMS

the school board or state, would be constitutionally impermissible. 1' 9 Here, the
court found the school board's inaction "ratified the teachers' conduct"" to
prevent a mockery of the Establishment Clause. However, the application of
ratification is doctrinally unsound in this instance. Ratification requires the actor,
whose conduct is later adopted by affirmative conduct or inaction,"' to purport
to act for or on behalf of the ratifier while engaging in the subject conduct."'
This essential element of ratification, purporting to act for another, is lacking
when the teacher or professor engages in personal disclosure. Thus, ratification
is an inappropriate rationale for subjecting individual conduct to scrutiny under
the Establishment Clause.
Neither preferential selection or ratification justify application of the
Establishment Clause to personal disclosure by professors on public university
campuses. However, college professors fulfill a public function in their capacity
as classroom teachers. Where the state delegates its responsibility, power, duty
or its public function to a private individual or entity, the individual or entity, in
the exercise of the delegated task or responsibility, is a "state actor". As a state
actor, the individual's conduct is subject to scrutiny for possible violation of the
prohibitions applicable through the Fourteenth Amendment." 3
State authorized bodies, such as the boards of regents or university trustees,
are created by statute or legislative charter to fulfill the state's constitutional or
statutory duty to encourage education and provide a means of educating the
populace." 4 Under governing rules and academic regulations promulgated by
such bodies, professors are delegated the task of instructing the student populace
and assessing which students satisfy standards set by governing authorities for
course completion, graduation, and/or certification. While teaching within the
classroom," 5 for the purposes of the Establishment Clause, a university

109
110

Id. at 1534.
Id.

"' RESTATEMENT (SECOND) AGENCY §§ 93, 94 (1933)[hereinafter RESTATEMENT].
112

Id. at §§ 84 and 85. See also RESTATFEmNT at § 85 comment a.

113Flagg Bros., Inc. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 157-165 (1978) (discussing the public function doctrine but

holding creditor's exercise of rights granted by statute did not constitute state action); Jackson v.
Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974) (insufficient nexus between state and action of
regulated utility); Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 395 (D. Conn. 1985) (action by
volunteer fire company subject to the Establishment Clause where town assumed under state law the
responsibility for fire protection and delegated its responsibility to volunteer fire company); Breen v.
Runkel, 614 F. Supp. 355, 358 (W.D. Mich. 1985) (teachers hired by local school boards that are created
and controlled by state law are state actors when acting in capacity of classroom teacher).
14 See, e.g., TENN. CONST. art X, § 12 (1970).
The Tennessee general assembly declared in the
Baccalaureate Education Savings for Tennessee Act that state government had a responsibility to maintain
institutions of higher education; and to foster higher education to provide well-educated citizens. TENN.
CODE ANN. § 49-7-902 (1990).
1" Any extension of the concept of state actor to the teacher after the conclusion of the instructional
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professor is a "state actor," and his or her expression must satisfy the test set forth

in Lemon v. Kurtzman." 6 If the expression fails to pass under the Lemon test,

a true conflict exists between the Establishment Clause and the Freedom of
Speech Clause. This tension, designed by the drafters to promote and maintain
17
balance through compromise and accommodation, must then be resolved.
In Bishop v. Aronov,

8

the University of Alabama raised the Establishment

Clause as a defense to an action brought by a professor challenging the
University's directive that he refrain from "'interject[ing] religious beliefs and/or
preferences during instructional time ...
and... [to cease] optional classes
where a 'Christian Perspective' of an academic topic is delivered.' 11 9 Neither

the District Court of Alabama nor the Eleventh Circuit addressed the issue of state
action and, hence, the propriety of the defense. The District Court's failure to

address the issue coupled with its testing of the professor's conduct under the
Establishment Clause suggests that the court assumed the state action requirement

had been met.

The challenged conduct was held constitutional under the

Establishment Clause by the District Court.12 '
address the issue.

The Eleventh Circuit did not

JAMES1 2' AND THE ESTABLISHMENT CLAUSE

This essay identifies three classes of expressive conduct that satisfy the
standard enunciated in James and that should be accorded constitutional protection
under the First Amendment Free Speech Clause. Even though permissible under
the Free Speech Clause, these classes of conduct must now be scrutinized under
the Establishment Clause. The three-prong test enunciated by the Supreme Court
in Lemon v. Kurtzman'2 must be applied to these classes of expressive activity

period, outside of the classroom, or beyond officially assigned tasks and responsibilities for Establishment
Clause purpose must be examined with great care to avoid undue encroachment on the individual's right

of free speech and a reduction in the proper tension between the two relevant clauses.
116 403 U.S. 602 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971), affd, 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
117 Although the Supreme Court has not addressed resolution of a true conflict, several lower courts have
made pronouncements on the methodology to be employed. See Bender v. Williamsport Area School
Dist., 741 F.2d at 558 (competing interests protected by each constitutional provision weighed in light of
the factual setting to determine the value of the opportunity to exercise the free speech right). But see
Libin v. Town of Greenwich, 625 F. Supp. 393, 395 (D. Conn. 1985) (dictum: "state actor
...cannot assert its own First Amendment right to free expression as a defense to any establishment
clause violation").
"a 732 F. Supp. 1562 (1990), rev'd, 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, Bishop v. Delchamps,
60 U.S.L.W. 3154 (U.S. June 29, 1992) No. 91-286.
119 Bishop, 926 F.2d at 1069.
Id. at 1070.
James v. Bd. of Education, 461 F.2d 566 (2d Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1042 (1972), reh'g
denied, 410 U.S. 947 (1973).
n2 403 U.S. 602 (1971), reh'g denied, 404 U.S. 876 (1971). aff 'd 411 U.S. 192 (1973).
10
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to determine if any violate the Establishment Clause. Emphasis is placed on the
factual context in which the religious activity - the individual professor's speech occurs. The free speech activity does not run afoul of the Establishment Clause

if: (1) the speech has a secular purpose; (2) its primary effect neither advances
nor inhibits religion; and (3) the speech does not foster excessive governmental
entanglement with religion.12 3 After first identifying the peculiar factual setting
in which the religious activity occurs, the professor's conduct must be tested
under each of the three requirements.
FactualSetting
The classes of expression addressed in this essay occur within the classrooms

of public institutions of higher education. These environments are recognized as
forums designed to encourage the exchange and development of novel and often

controversial values, views, and ideologies.' 2 ' These classrooms are environs
where ideas are exchanged as in a marketplace and where new theorems are
conceived.'2 5

The mission of the university is to educate a populace to

guarantee continuation of our peculiar form of democratic self-government.
Course offerings, both required and elective, present a wide-array of political,

economic, theological, and sociological teachings and theories, as well as a variety
of professors from which the student may choose.
The recipients of the expressive activity are mature young adults, "semiautonomous citizens"' 26 who have voluntarily enrolled in the college or
university program. In some geographical areas and some advanced programs,

the proportion of older adults - veterans, second career students, and "empty-nesters'' 12 7 - may belie the term "young". No impressionable school age child is

12 Id. at 612-13.
' The UCLA catalogue of graduate study describes graduate study as the "pursuit of new knowledge

through research." The environment is described as one that "promotes the quality of original work and
study." UCLA General Catalog 1989-90, at 48.
The University of Vermont states in its 1990-91 catalogue that its mission is accomplished
"[t]hrough a widespread spirit of inquiry and investigative rigor... faculty, staff, and students participate
in extending humankind's knowledge of self and environment."
"=Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169, 189 (1972); Keyishian, 385 U.S. at 603; Bender v. Williamsport Area
School Dist., 741 F.2d 538 (3rd Cir. 1984). vacated on other grounds, 475 U.S. 534 (1986). The UCLA
catalog invites potential students to its campus for the following experience:
At UCLA you are taught by the people making the discoveries, so you learn the latest
findings on every front. You may exchange ideas with faculty members who are authorities
in their fields, and even as undergraduates you are encouraged to participate in research to
experience firsthand the discovery of new knowledge.
UCLA General Catalog 1989-90, at 9 (emphasis added).
'

Doe v. Human, 725 F. Supp. 1503, 1507 (W.D. Ark 1989). cert. denied, 111 S. Ct. 1315 (1991).

'=

Many older women students who have forgone higher education and career opportunities for the sake
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involved. Rather, all undergraduate and professional students are presumed to
possess intellectual and rational maturity. The educational goal is no longer to
inculcate basic values but to challenge and test those basic values instilled in
primary and secondary school at a time when the individual student has the
sufficient maturity to choose between competing systems.
1. Secular Purpose. 28
The three classes of expressive activity - wearing religious pins, insignia with
slogans, selecting relevant material from religious books, and making statements
that reveal theological bias relevant to substantive issues or the interpersonal
relationship between professor and student - must have a secular purpose to
satisfy the first prong of the Lemon test. Permitting professors to be identified
as having a religious bias by wearing a cross, 9 using material from religious
resources, and making statements based on theological bias, is consistent with the
university's secular purpose of providing students with a broad exposure to new
ideas and competing value systems. Students are given yet another insight on
competing policy concerns on significant issues such as the death penalty,
individual privacy, or origin of man. 130 The poetic style of Psalms and the
sharp and concise similes of Proverbs, like Shakespeare, Milton, and Keats,
provide rich material for literature classes.' 3' Old Testament records of the
origin of Middle Eastern political and cultural conflict provide a historical
framework for discussing current problems and potential solutions.
On the typical university or college campus, the voices of "state actors" are
numerous and varied. State actors speak from a Marxist
or third world
perspective. The expression of the atheist state actor blends with that of the
politically and theologically neutral, or the expression of African or Asian
Americans. The addition of religious expression to this cacophony on the
university campus is consistent not only with the university's mission, but with
democratic values of tolerance and openmindedness. The addition of the religious
expression avoids the potential of indoctrination in a single ideological point of

of raising families are now entering student ranks of both undergraduate and professional programs.
For a criticism of the secular purpose test see Culbertson, Religion in the PoliticalProcess: A Critique
of Lemon's Purpose Test, 1990 U. ILL L. REv. 915.
'2

129 Jewish professors may wear Stars of David or yatrnulkes, skull caps worn by Jewish men.

See, e.g., Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (christian professor referred to his
religious belief on the creative force behind the human physiology), rev'd 926 F.2d 1066 (11th Cir.
1991), cert. denied, Bishop v. Delchamps, __ S. Ct. ___, 60 U.S.LW. 3154 (U.S. June 29, 1992).
'0

See Roberts v. Madigan, 702 F. Supp. 1505 (D. Colo. 1989) (distinguishing permissible uses of biblical
material from impermissible religious works in elementary school setting), affd, 921 F.2d 1047 (10th Cir.
1990).
132Cooper v. Ross, 472 F. Supp. 802 (E.D. Ark. 1979) (professor stated his personal and philosophical
'3'

views based on Marxism).
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view, the irreligious, and negates the potential to create an atmosphere hostile to
religion. Thus, the expression has a secular purpose.
2.

Primary Effect

The inquiry here is whether the university conveys to an objective observer
in the student's position an approval of religion.13 3 An objective observer
enrolled in an undergraduate English literature class, a law school constitutional
law course, a graduate biology class, or any of the many courses offered on
modem American campuses is unlikely to perceive university approval of religion
from the expressive conduct by the individual professor. The age and maturity
of the students coupled with the cultural, philosophical, and ethnic mix of faculty
is contraindicative of university approval or endorsement of religion. In Widmar
v. Vincent, M the presence of a variety of student organizations on the university
campus results in a benefit to a broad spectrum of groups, both religious and nonreligious. The benefit to nonreligious groups is an index of the secular effect.
In addition, a broad spectrum of doctrines, opinions, and ideologies benefit from
speech by individual professors. Personal speech from professor's reinforces both
the secular effect and the absence of university approval of religion. Moreover,
just as college and university students are unlikely to attribute university
endorsement of Marxism, homosexuality, non-violent civil disobedience, or
feminism from statements of bias on these topics by professors within the
classroom, so also are the students unlikely to attribute university approval of
religion from statements by professors.
However, a restriction or ban on religious speech will convey a message of
disapproval of religion, especially given the educational goals of universities.
Hence, the primary effect of the religious expression by individual professors has
a secular effect and does not result in any endorsement of religion. Permitting
relevant religious speech serves a secular effect of preventing discrimination
against religion. Any resulting benefit to religion from the permitted speech is
incidental, as it is with other ideologies. The Establishment Clause does not
prohibit incidental benefits resulting from speech with a secular purpose. 3 5

Board of Educ. of Westside Community Schools v. Mergens, 496 U.S. 226, (1990)(plurality opinion);
Widmar v. Vincent. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
'34 454 U.S. at 274-75.
" Id. at 273 (granting all student groups equal access to university facilities makes the practice of religion
more accessible and results in an incidental benefit to religion); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420,
422 (1961) (statute that prohibits sale on Sunday of non-exempt merchandise provides a uniform day of
rest the fact that the day has particular significance for a majority of religious sects does not violate the
Establishment Clause).
"
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3. Excessive Entanglements
The third and final test in determining whether the speech is prohibited, is
a determination of whether there is excessive entanglement between the university

and the religious expression."36 The issue is a procedural question: whether
"'continuing state surveillance will inevitably be required to ensure that [the]
13
restrictions [of] ...the First Amendment [are] respected.' 7

The excessive entanglements prong of the Lemon test, in this context, is
violated if state or university officials must identify and distinguish religious
statements from secular ones and, thereby, engage in continued surveillance of
faculty speech to approve or interpret their statements. Here, prohibiting rather
than permitting personal disclosure results in excessive entanglements. 3 8
Statements in the classroom which are protected as Free Speech, relevant

religious speech, do not involve excessive entanglements with religion. A greater
risk of excessive entanglement is likely if all relevant religious speech is

prohibited rather than permitted. 39 Continuous monitoring and interpreting of
all faculty speech - speech by both the religious and the atheist - will be

necessary to identify words or materials that have significance for religious
purposes and that are otherwise secular and permissible. A non-discrimination
4
policy avoids rather than creates impermissible excessive entanglements.' 0

l3 This third prong has been criticized by several of the Justices. See, e.g., Aquilar v. Felton, 473 U.S.
dissenting); Wallace
402, 420 (1985) (Rehnquist, ., dissenting); Aquilar, 473 U.S. at 430 (O'Connor, J.,
v. Jaffree, 472 U.S. at 109-110 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting); Roemer v. Board of Public Works, 426 U.S.
736, 755, 768-69 (1976) (White, I., concurring).
137Bender v. Williamsport Area School Dist., 741 F.2d 538, 555 (3rd Cir. 1984), vacated on other
grounds,475 U.S. 534 (1986) (quoting Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 619 (1971), reh'g denied, 404
U.S. 876 (1971), aff'd, 411 U.S. 192 (1973)).
In Widnar v. Vincent, the Supreme Court suggested that university enforcement of its policy to exclude
religious worship or speech by denying religious student organizations access to university facilities and
participation in the open forum created on campus results in excessive entanglements. 454 U.S. 263,272
n.11 (1981).
"3

"9See Widrnar, 454 U.S. at 272 n.11; Bishop, 732 F. Supp. at 1507.
In Bishop v. Aronov, 732 F. Supp. 1562 (N.D. Ala. 1990), plaintiff, an assistant professor, made
occasional remarks in class reflecting his personal religious beliefs concerning the subjects that he taught
He also informed students who questioned him concerning various academic stresses that his religious
beliefs were more important than the sources of such stresses. He further shared that his beliefs enabled
him to cope with academic stresses. The professor also conducted an after-class discussion of his course
material from a religious perspective. Students were not compelled to attend the discussions, and the
professor used an anonymous grading system for examinations. These activities, conducted on a statesupported university campus, were held by the District Court to be protected Free Speech. /Idat 1566-67.
The District Court further determined that the professor's comments had a secular purpose and that their
primary effect was neither to advance nor to inhibit religion. Id at 1567. Hence, the conduct met the
first two requisites of the Lemon test. Having made these determinations, the court found without
discussion that plaintiff's activities would not "lead to excessive government entanglement with religion."
Id. at 1568.
The Eleventh Circuit reversed the District Court. See introductory note for a brief discussion of
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CONCLUSION

If it is determined that the professor's individual expressive conduct under
the Lemon test has a secular purpose and effect and does not result in excessive
entanglement, no Establishment Clause violation results. Therefore, no true
conflict exists between Freedom of Speech and the Establishment Clause. Of
significance here is the initial determination of the nature of the speech.
Relevant, objective religious speech should be accorded protection on the
university campus. Freedom of Speech is not an absolute right but is subject to
limitations. If religious speech within the classroom exceeds the boundaries
identified, it should not be afforded constitutional protection.
Steven N. Calm argues that instead of shielding students from error, they
should be subjected to all views."4' He quotes John Stuart Mill, "He who
knows only his own side of the case, knows little of that.""4 If professors do
not offer their beliefs, theological as well as philosophical, for students to
consider, students will be deprived of perhaps the most important view of all.
Students who are not exposed to all major world views may select and follow one
view based on incomplete information.
Legally, in the university setting a professor's theological statements relevant
to course material or those statements designed to acquaint students with his or
her approach to issues, life, and values are protected under the First Amendment,
and this protection is essential to prevent the state's indoctrination of its ideas.
It appears that many in academia have misunderstood the doctrine of "separation
of church and state." Such a doctrine is not meant to eliminate religious issues
from the classroom, but to prevent indoctrination and the establishment of a
specific theological bias.
There are limits on espousing political, philosophical, or theological positions
classes
where the positions espoused are irrelevant. Professors should be
in
conscious of these limitations. The above discussion demonstrates the need for
more than mere data transfer in institutions of higher learning. Professors in all
disciplines should assume responsibility for satisfying this need.
The counter-balance, however, is the ethical obligation of professors not to
exploit their position of power to indoctrinate a captive audience with their biases,
whether political, religious, or social. Nevertheless, it would seem that professors

the court's opinion. For a criticism of the court's analysis see Note, Constitutional Law -- Freedom of
Religious Speech - When Freedom of Speech in the Classroom Conflicts with the Establishment Clause,
14 UALR LJ.83 (1991).
141 S. CAHN,SAmS AND ScAMPS: ETIcs IN ACADEMIA (1986).
'42d. at 6.
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who submit their world views for students' consideration are more honest and
demonstrate greater concern for the whole student than professors who do not.
Professors owe at least this minimum involvement to their students. Professors
who are willing to go beyond this minimum should provide opportunities to
interact in an appropriate social environment outside of class.
Good judgment must be exercised to determine how much or how often
professors reveal their biases in class. Certainly, professors are not legally
obligated to conduct extracurricular discussions. However, their ethical obligation
is another matter. Professors who have an articulated philosophy of life or
religious beliefs to which they are committed should be motivated to bridge the
gap decried by Boyer.

